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What's Really Wrong With The Accounting Profession? 
Keynote Speech 
A. A. Sommer, Jr. 
Chairman, Public Oversight Board 
It is a great pleasure and honor for me to be able to speak at this distinguished and 
respected symposium which has gained such stature within the accounting profession 
and which, over the years, has provided a means for exploring the important issues 
confronting the accounting profession. The topics on the program this year evidence 
the continuing commitment of the sponsors of this program to the discussion of themes 
which are of tremendous practical, as well as theoretical, importance to the profession. 
When I was asked for a title for my remarks, I thought for a few seconds and 
suggested, "What's Really Wrong with the Accounting Profession?" Only as I 
reflected on that title later did I fully realize that it might raise expectations different 
from what I intended to say. It is not my intention to "dump" on the profession or the 
fine people who practice accounting. What I am really going to talk about is how the 
financial reporting process may be strengthened and the dangers to professionalism I 
see in the present climate mitigated. For the most part I won't cover the ground the 
POB did in its March, 1993 Report. 
Strengthening Financial Reporting 
I am a fervent believer in disclosure as the foundation of our securities regulatory 
system in this country. At the core of meaningful disclosure is financial information -
reliable, timely, relevant, useful and understandable financial information. That 
truism, long-accepted, was reiterated in the 1973 Report of the Study Group on the 
Objectives of Financial Statements prepared under the aegis of Robert M . Trueblood, 
a distinguished partner of one of the predecessor firms of the co-sponsor of this 
conference. The importance of communicating that information was underscored by 
the Long-Range Objectives Committee of the AICPA some years ago: 
A satisfactory system for communicating financial and other economic data is an essential condition 
for the accumulations of capital from widespread sources in single enterprises - i.e. for a successful 
industrial economy. Persons who have an interest in resources are in varying degrees of remoteness 
from them and from the factors affecting them. The greater this remoteness, the greater the need for 
communication of data... In fact, without assurance of reliable economic data, the remote investor 
or creditor probably would not supply capital to the enterprise... (Emphasis in the original) 
The auditor's role in the "reliability, timeliness, relevance, usefulness and under-
standability" formula is principally the assurance of reliability and those assurances 
enhance the usefulness of the information. Along with the information itself, the 
extent to which the information may be relied upon must be effectively communi-
cated. I would say that while the quantum and quality of information about issuers 
that is being communicated to shareholders and investors have steadily improved 
(witness the SEC's recent rule changes concerning disclosure with respect to execu-
tive compensation), there has been scant improvement in communicating the extent to 
which the information is reliable. 
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In 1978 the AICPA-organized Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities published 
its report. A significant part of that report discussed the contents of the auditor's report 
on financial statements. In the course of its discussion of this subject it quoted the 
report of the auditors of the United States Steel Corporation in 1903. It is informative, 
detailed and provides an interesting contrast to the sterile and boiler-plate style which 
has prevailed since at least 1933 in various iterations. 
The Cohen Commission (the popular appellation for the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities) included in its report an illustration of what it perceived to be a 
desirable form of auditor's report. It took up more than an eight-and-a-half by eleven 
page in the report (and the type was relatively small) and included eight meaty and 
informative paragraphs. The Auditing Standards Board, in response to the Report, 
undertook revisions of the standard report. What was the result? Instead of two stereo-
typed paragraphs, we now have three stereotyped paragraphs that nobody, but nobody, 
reads or heeds. 
Amid all the consternation (justified, I might add) within the profession about audi-
tors' exposure to litigation, I would suggest that means at hand to significantly reduce 
that exposure are being ignored. Let me elaborate. 
Every line in a balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement looks like 
every other line. "Cash" looks just like "inventory", looks just like "property, plant 
and equipment" which may include huge amounts of "soft costs" that have been 
included on that line in the expectation of future benefits that are by no means assured 
of realization. And to the laymen, including some sophisticated users of information, 
the auditor's opinion is as much an assurance of the reliability of any line as it is of the 
"Cash" line. 
I have on occasion only half-facetiously suggested that financial statements should 
be prepared in varying shades of grey. Dark, dark ink and bold typeface should be 
used for cash. Inventories should be slightly lighter; capitalized costs uncertain of 
realization should be, not in disappearing ink, but in very light ink and type. And then 
the auditor's opinion should explain the significance in the degrees of shading. 
I would suggest to you that some of the woes of the accounting profession flowing 
from the savings and loan debacle in this country might have been avoided if the 
auditor had communicated the limits of extent to which people could rely on the 
financial statements of the savings and loans. How about this as a paragraph in the 
opinion of an auditor of a savings and loan: 
$ of the assets of the company ( %) consist of loans secured by mortgages 
with no provision for recourse against the borrower. Thus the company's ability to realize on these 
assets depends upon the ability of the borrower to make timely payments and the continued value of 
the underlying asset. While the documents in the files of the company indicate that the value of the 
real estate underlying the mortgages is presently in excess of the amount of the loans and that the 
cash flows from the properties (with respect to loans in the amount of $ cash flows have 
not commenced) wil l be sufficient to assure orderly amortization of the debt, there is no assurance 
that these conditions wil l continue. 
There is presently developing in securities law a doctrine called "bespeaks 
caution." In the words of one court, 
...The essence of the [bespeaks caution] doctrine is that where an offering statement, such as a 
prospectus, accompanies statements of its future forecasts, projections and expectations with 
adequate cautionary language, those statements are not actionable as securities fraud (Emphasis 
supplied). 
While this is a relatively new doctrine and one that does not yet enjoy the impri-
matur of the Supreme Court (although it has been approved by the Second Circuit 
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Court of Appeals, the preeminent commercial court in the country), it should provoke 
a renewed consideration by the accounting profession of how, through effective 
communications, it can enjoy the benefits of "bespeaks caution." This would entail a 
careful delineation of the uncertainties inherent in financial statements, a statement 
tailored to the issuer's statements, not new boilerplate. 
The POB in its report urged the Auditing Standards Board to revise the auditor's 
standard report to make the prospective nature of certain accounting estimates clear, 
including a caveat that the estimated results may not be achieved. This communication 
should not be written as a defensive retrenchment by the auditing profession, but 
rather as a more realistic and reasonable explanation of the limitation of assurance that 
can be provided on certain accounting estimates. 
Happily the Auditing Standards Board's Auditing Soft Information Task Force has 
undertaken consideration of this proposal. A significant step toward better communi-
cation with regard to these matters has been the approval recently by the Accounting 
Standards Executive Committee of its slightly modified exposure draft on risks and 
uncertainties. The POB in its report last year strongly advocated adoption of this state-
ment and we are most hopeful that the F A S B wi l l now approve i t .† While the 
application of the statement is somewhat narrower than I would like, I believe this 
statement will give a powerful tool to accountants in compelling client disclosure of 
important risks and uncertainties related to the business. I would hazard a guess that 
had this statement been in effect ten years ago some of the problems associated with 
the audits of savings and loans could have been avoided. 
The preliminary report of the A I C P A Special Committee's Study of the In-
formation Needs of Today's Users of Financial Reporting (the Jenkins Committee) 
indicates that "Users want companies to disclose information about the estimates and 
assumptions used to determine material assets and liability amounts." 
I am informed that this desire of users will probably be reflected in one or more 
recommendations of that Committee. The problem then will be to develop the neces-
sary consensus to implement the recommendation. That is the toughest task. 
Congressman Edward Markey of Massachusetts has recently asked the General 
Accounting Office to review the various reports which have been prepared by 
accounting bodies since 1975 and report on the extent to which the recommendations 
in them have been acted upon. While in many respects the profession has responded 
earnestly, I fear this study may reveal that other important recommendations have 
been ignored or only partially implemented. I wi l l cite as Exhibit A the matter I 
referred to earlier, the failure of the Auditing Standards Board to come to grip 
adequately with the recommendation of the Cohen Commission that the auditor's 
report be made more meaningful. 
I think it is imperative that top management assume greater responsibility for the 
internal controls and the internal auditing function of their companies, and that the 
external auditors assume greater responsibility for those controls and internal audit 
functions. I understand that the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of 
the Treadway Commission and the General Accounting Office have reached agree-
ment on what a management statement with respect to internal controls should 
embrace. This a great step forward, and I hope it will be followed by action from the 
SEC mandating, one, management reporting on internal controls in accordance with 
the COSO Report, Internal Control - Integrated Framework, and, two, external 
auditor reporting on the validity of management's representations. 
It has approved the Statement of Position. 
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In arguing against any requirement that the external auditor report on internal 
controls, Robert A . Bowman, executive vice president and chief financial officer of 
ITT Corporation and the spokesman for the Financial Executives Institute, at the 
hearing held by Senator Dodd of Connecticut on private litigation under the securities 
laws in July of last year said, 
Any public accounting firm, any firm, that suggests to you and this committee that it does not under-
stand a company's internal controls and they still sign that letter of opinion we think is engaging in 
sophistry. 
We would not expect any public accounting firm to sign its name without understanding fully and 
completely the internal controls of a company, large or small. (Emphasis added) 
I respectfully suggest that i f Mr. Bowman is correct, then there should be no 
problem - or significant added expense - in requiring auditors to opine on manage-
ment's representations with respect to the company's internal controls. I would 
therefore reiterate the recommendation which the Public Oversight Board made in its 
March 5, 1993 report: a company's auditors should be required to report on the repre-
sentations of management with respect to their company's internal controls. The SEC 
has indicated an unwillingness to mandate this. I would urge that some responsible 
large companies voluntarily move in this direction and pioneer a healthy and needed 
additional safeguard for investors - and themselves. 
Dangers to Professionalism 
The second problem I perceive with the accounting profession is one related to 
professionalism and emanates from a society-wide circumstance. Competition has 
always been present in the accounting profession, but I suspect it has never been as 
intense, as tough, as dangerous, as it is now. 
More intense competition has infected every corner of our society; my own profes-
sion is experiencing a measure of competition it has never before seen. Where the 
intensification of competition originated is not clear. Some ascribe it to the onset of 
more international competition which compelled enterprises in this country to sharpen 
their claws; others say it is an inevitable progression in a market economy. 
In the professions, I think there may be some unique circumstances. For one thing, 
I think professionals have become more concerned with their incomes than with their 
status as professionals. Sol Linowitz, a distinguished lawyer and former government 
official, in his recent book, The Betrayed Profession, which deals with events in the 
legal profession, quotes a young lawyer in a mid-size law firm: "The practice of law 
changed forever when lawyers decided they should be making as much money as their 
clients." That quote, I think, is equally applicable to accountants. 
When the increasing concern with income combines with the increased trans-
parency with respect to economic information concerning firms and their members, 
there is bound to be increased pressure on the management of firms to maximize the 
returns to their partners lest they lose them to seemingly more prosperous competitors 
or other kinds of occupations which can use their skills. 
Another factor, reenforcing these competitive forces, has been the determination of 
the federal regulatory authorities and the courts to regard the professions as no dif-
ferent from other ways of making a living. Thus, measures and rules once thought to 
be safeguards against unethical and unprofessional conduct were thrown out without 
any discerning examination of whether professions should be considered just other 
businesses. It was scant consolation when I heard a sitting FTC Commissioner at a bar 
meeting suggest that the FTC had grievously erred when it went down that road. 
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The more intense the competition, whatever the source of that intensity, the more 
pressure there is on law compliance, on ethics, and on judgment. We read daily of 
businessmen who cross the line between legal and illegal. They don't make that 
crossing because they are evil or malicious or indifferent; they often do it because they 
feel they must if they are to compete effectively and meet the expectations of their 
superiors. How much more fragile and elastic are the boundaries of ethics. And how 
much more easily infected is professional judgment. 
I have often posited the case of the rising young partner in a major firm who 
manages an office of his or her firm in, to bring it close to home, let's say Kansas City. 
He is also the engagement partner of the office's largest client which accounts for 
about a quarter of the revenues of the office. 
The financial statements prepared by the client classify as restructuring costs 
certain items which the young partner believes should be recurring period costs. He 
expresses this opinion to the chief financial officer, who challenges him to point to the 
accounting literature which compels that the costs be classified as recurring period 
costs. The young partner says he cannot point to such authority, but in his professional 
judgment the proper treatment is to classify the items as recurring period costs. The 
CFO mentions that he casually discussed this at a cocktail party with a partner of a 
competing firm, one which young partner knows has been lusting after the business, 
who indicated he agreed with the CFO as to the proper accounting treatment. 
The young partner's dilemma is clear. If he loses the client a substantial number of 
staff in the office will, at least for some time, be underutilized. He hopes the manage-
ment of the firm will realize that he has lost the client on a matter of principle and will 
not penalize him in his career, and hopes, in fact, they will back him. But what about 
next year i f the staff is still underutilized and no new clients have filled the void? And 
the year after, and the one after that? It is not difficult to empathize with the agony of 
that young partner. 
One would hope that if he acquiesced in the insistence of his client and opined on 
the financial statements as prepared by the client that the concurring partner would 
block approval, or that one or the other would consult on the issue. If the end of the 
process is that the client walks because of either the engagement partner taking a 
tough stand, or the concurring partner or consulting partner doing so, the problem 
confronting the young partner is the same: how to fill the void? 
I would hope that in this sort of situation the top management of the firm would set 
a "tone" by assuring that insistence on good accounting and financial reporting does 
not ever penalize a partner. I was told once of the head of a major firm who, at a 
partner's meeting, singled out a partner who had lost a major client because of an 
accounting disagreement and hailed him as the "partner of the year." 
There is no question that auditors today are more willing than before to take tough 
stands even at the risk of losing clients, and increasingly they state forthrightly the 
reasons for their departure in connection with the client's Form 8-K. But I fear there 
are still a troubling number of occasions when my scenario is a real one and an unde-
sirable accounting practice not clearly contrary to an articulated principle is accepted 
by the auditor. The number of such instances can only be reduced if it is made clear 
by the top management of firms that not only are those who generate and perpetuate 
business amply rewarded, but so are those who on reasonable grounds refuse to go 
along with corner-cutting clients. 
And I would urge that a firm which is approached to take on a client which has 
deserted another auditor because of an auditing or accounting disagreement consider 
carefully whether it really wants to reenforce the belief that exists in many quarters 
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that accounting principles and auditing standards are "for sale." Accounting is not and 
probably never will be exact and reducible to formulas so precise that there can not be 
disagreement among honest accountants. But I would suggest that the case for acqui-
escing in a potential client's wishes who is changing auditors because of disagreement 
should be an overwhelmingly compelling one before the auditor accepts the client. 
Audit committees, which have been a particular matter of interest and concern to the 
POB and to me personally, are important both from the standpoint of sound financial 
reporting and professionalism. I believe their potential for assuring honest financial 
reporting has been little realized and I believe the realization of that potential can only 
be accomplished by auditors. In undertaking that task I think auditors may not only 
contribute to sound corporate governance, but also reduce their exposure to liability. It 
is not enough for auditors to publish booklets on audit committees, excellent as those 
pamphlets generally are. In my experience, few audit committee members read them 
and study them and conform their conduct to the advice contained in them. 
I have urged in the past, and I urge again, that the auditor of every publicly held 
company with an audit committee arrange to meet with the audit committee for two or 
three hours to outline how an audit committee should function, the duties it should 
assume, the concerns it should have. The superb report prepared by Price Waterhouse 
for the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Improving Audit Com-
mittees: What Works Best, would be an excellent guide for such a presentation. Also 
helpful would be the matrices in Appendix E of the POB's Report, In the Public 
Interest, and in the Price Waterhouse report, both of which are based on the Treadway 
Commission Report. These matrices provide the means for an audit committee to do a 
searching analysis of its practices and compare them to the excellent recommenda-
tions of that Commission. But I am convinced that without the initiative of the 
external auditors that sort of self-analysis simply will not occur. If audit committees 
did what they should, they would be immeasurably better able to assess the fairness of 
the presentation proposed by management, monitor disagreements between manage-
ment and the auditors, and provide an additional level of assurance that management 
is honest with its auditors. 
Let me close by remarking upon the response to the POB's Report, In the Public 
Interest. Soon after its publication, the AICPA and the "Big Six" endorsed all of its 
recommendations. This has been most gratifying to the members of the Board. Even 
more gratifying is the alacrity with which the SEC Practice Section has undertaken 
initiatives to strengthen the ability of auditors to detect fraud (a consequence of an 
audit expected by the overwhelming number of users of financial statements) and to 
use the information secured in the course of inquiries by the Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee to warn the profession of pitfalls they should avoid. 
Again, let me repeat how privileged I feel to have had this opportunity to meet with 
all of you and express a few thoughts of someone who, while closely associated with 
the accounting profession in a number of capacities for many years, is still just a 
lawyer and, from your viewpoint, a layman. 
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